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CRIMINAL LAW – UNLAWFUL POSSESSION 
 
Summary 
Appellant Albert Gallegos was charged under NRS 202.360(1)(b),2 in 2004, with 
one count of unlawful possession of a firearm after police arrested him at his home in 
Clark County and found a firearm inside that home. That charge was based on a 1998 
felony warrant issued by a California superior court.  The California court issued the 
warrant when Gallegos failed to appear for sentencing after pleading nolo contendere to 
seven felony charges.  At his Nevada trial, Gallegos testified that he did not appear for his 
sentencing hearing because the California superior court told him when he entered his 
plea that “he’d recommend me not stepping a foot back in California ever again.”  He 
further testified that he did not know he needed to return for sentencing because when he 
reported to the probation office shortly after he entered his plea, as directed by the 
California superior court, that office had no record of Gallegos’s charges in its system.  
Believing that his case had been resolved, he left California and returned to Las Vegas. 
            Prior to his Nevada trial, Gallegos filed a motion to dismiss the unlawful 
possession charge, arguing that NRS 202.360(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague and fails 
to provide sufficient notice that he cannot possess a firearm because it does not define the 
term “fugitive from justice.”  The court denied the motion and conducted a trial during 
which the court instructed the jury that “[a] fugitive from justice is any person who has 
fled from any state to avoid prosecution for a crime.”  That instruction was derived from 
the federal definition of “fugitive from justice” found in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(15).  At the 
end of the evidentiary portion of his trial, Gallegos renewed his motion to dismiss the 
charge on constitutional grounds and the court again denied.  The jury found that 
Gallegos was a “fugitive from justice” and was guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm 
in violation of NRS 202.360(1)(b).  Gallegos was sentenced to a prison term of 1 to 6 
years.  This appeal followed. 
The Nevada Supreme Court performed a Due Process analysis: “A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague and subject to facial attack if it (1) fails to provide notice 
sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is 
                                                 
1 By Matthew Engle 
2 The applicable part of the statute reads: 
1. A person shall not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any firearm if 
he: 
(a) Has been convicted of a felony in this or any other state, or in any political 
subdivision thereof, or of a felony in violation of the laws of the United States of 
America, unless he has received a pardon and the pardon does not restrict his right to bear 
arms; 
(b) Is a fugitive from justice; or 
(c) Is an unlawful user of, or addicted to, any controlled substance. 
A person who violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a category B felony and shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a 
maximum term of not more than 6 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than 
$5,000. 
 
 
prohibited and (2) lacks specific standards, thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even 
failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”3  
 
NRS 202.360(1)(b) gives insufficient notice 
             
The notice to citizens that a statute provides is insufficient if it is so imprecise and 
vague that people of ordinary intelligence cannot understand what conduct is prohibited.4  
However, when the Legislature does not define each term it uses in a statute, the statute 
will survive a constitutional challenge “if there are well settled and ordinarily understood 
meanings for the words employed when viewed in the context of the entire statutory 
provision.”5   
 Here the Court concluded that the statute does not survive this first prong of the 
test because the Legislature did not define the term “fugitive from justice.”  NRS 
202.360(1)(b).  While the statute appears to be modeled on a similar federal law, that law 
contained a definition of “fugitive from justice.”  By not including that portion in the 
Nevada law, the Legislature left it unclear whether that was intended to mean that the 
Nevada definition should differ from the federal statute.  As such, NRS 202.360(1)(b) as 
written, leaves citizens to guess whether even an unpaid parking or traffic ticket subjects 
them to the ambit of the statute.   
            The Court also noted that it cannot determine from the statute’s provisions 
whether the person has to have been formally charged with a crime, be wanted as a 
suspect but not yet indicted, be guilty of a crime but not yet discovered, be wanted for 
general questioning relating to a crime, or whether the person even has to know he has 
committed a crime.   
            Furthermore, other Nevada cases fail to give a single, well-defined definition for 
the term “fugitive from justice.”  For these reasons, the statute does not provide enough 
notice as to what conduct it prohibits.   
 
NRS 202.360(1)(b) lacks specific standards and thereby allows for its arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement 
 
            Under the second prong of the vagueness test, a statute is unconstitutional if it 
“lacks specific standards, thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”6  In Silvar v. District Court, the Court 
analyzed and struck down a Clark County ordinance under this second prong because, 
among other things, law enforcement officers had too much discretion in determining 
whether the ordinance had been violated. 
Like the ordinance in Silvar, the Court held that NRS 202.360(1)(b) is susceptible 
to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because it does not specify the circumstances 
under which a person can be arrested and prosecuted as a fugitive from justice in 
possession of a firearm.  It therefore establishes no clear standards to guide law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, district courts, and, ultimately, jurors as to whether a 
                                                 
3 Silvar v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 292, 129 P.3d 682, 684 (2006).    .  
4 City of Las Vegas v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 859, 864, 59 P.3d 477, 481 (2002). 
5 Woofter v. O’Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 562, 542 P.2d 1396, 1400 (1975).  
6 Silvar, 122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at 685. 
violation has occurred.  Without a statutory or well-settled and commonly understood 
definition of “fugitive from justice” to which Gallegos’s actions could be compared, the 
prosecutor, defense counsel, and district court were left to their own personal 
predilections to determine whether NRS 202.360(1)(b) could be enforced against 
Gallegos. 
            
Because NRS 202.360(1)(b) fails both prongs of the test, the Nevada Supreme 
Court reversed Gallegos’s conviction and ruled the statute unconstitutional. 
 
Issue and Disposition   
 
Issue 
 Is NRS 202.360(1)(b) unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define “fugitive 
from justice?” 
 
Disposition 
Yes, the Nevada Supreme Court held the statute was unconstitutionally vague 
because it: (1) fails to provide notice sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence 
to understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) lacks specific standards, thereby 
encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. 
 
Dissent 
 Justice Parraguirre issued a dissenting opinion in which he disagrees with the 
proposition that the term “fugitive from justice” is unconstitutionally vague.  In it he 
writes that the term has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning.  In the past, he 
argues, this court has defined the term “fugitive from justice” as a person who has (1) 
committed a crime in another state, (2) been charged in that state with the commission of 
such crime, and (3) fled from justice and is within this state.7  This definition, he 
continues, fits within the meaning supplied by Webster’s New International Dictionary, 
which identifies a “fugitive from justice” as “[o]ne who, having committed, or being 
accused of, a crime in one jurisdiction, flees to avoid punishment.”8   
In light of these compatible, common definitions, the Justice argues that Gallegos has 
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the term “fugitive from justice” fails to 
provide sufficient notice of prohibited conduct.  For this reason, Justice Parraguirre 
dissented from the majority’s conclusion that NRS 202.360(1)(b) is unconstitutionally 
vague. 
 
Commentary 
 
State of Law before Gallegos v. State 
 Prior to this case there was no single, well-defined definition for the term 
“fugitive from justice.”  Different cases have taken different approaches.  For example, in 
                                                 
7 Ex parte Lorraine, 16 Nev. 63, 63 (1881); Castriotta v. State, 111 Nev. 67, 69 n.2, 888 P.2d 927, 929 n.2 
(1995).  
8 Webster’s New International Dictionary 1016 (2d ed. 1961). 
Ex parte Lorraine9 and Castriotta v. State,10 the Court concluded that four elements are 
necessary to qualify a person as a “fugitive from justice.”  The person must have (1) 
committed a crime in another state, (2) been charged in that state with the commission of 
that crime, (3) fled from justice, and (4) been found within this state.11   
However, in Robinson v. Leypoldt the Court used a definition inconsistent with 
those two cases because it stated that a person must have merely “departed” from another 
state rather than “fled” - the underlying intent differs.12  Similarly, the Court noted, the 
common dictionary definition of “fugitive from justice” is broad enough to include 
anyone who is absent from another state for “any reason,” without clarifying whether that 
person must have intended to flee or whether leaving the state for some other purpose or 
under some other state of mind is sufficient.13 
In either case, this statute was being enforced as-is until this case brought the 
inconsistencies of the various definitions of “fugitive from justice” before the Court. 
 
Other Jurisdictions 
This statue is modeled after federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922.  However, unlike the 
Nevada statute, the federal law included a specific definition of “fugitive from justice,” 
thus avoiding the issue before the Nevada Supreme Court in this case.  18 U.S.C. § 
921(a)(15) provides that “[t]he term ‘fugitive from justice’ means any person who has 
fled from any State to avoid prosecution for a crime or to avoid giving testimony in any 
criminal proceeding.”  Congress enacted this definition of “fugitive from justice” in 
1968.14    
 
Effect of Gallegos v. Nevada on Current Law 
  This law has now been struck down as unconstitutional.  To fix it the Legislature 
will have to define the term “fugitive from justice” in the statute. 
 
Unanswered Questions 
 This case brings up several issues for the prosecution and defendants who are 
accused or have been convicted under this statute.  For defendants facing charges under 
the statue, the prosecution must rethink its strategy.  It no longer appears that a person 
can be convicted under this statute alone.  However, in this case the defendant’s situation 
was somewhat unusual in that it was a situation where “fugitive from justice” may or 
may not have applied.  The court did not address cases where the previous offense may 
have been more severe, thus leaving less room for misinterpretation of the statute.  
 The case also calls into question any previous convictions that have been made 
under this statute.  Defense attorneys may be able to appeal and seek reversal for any 
convictions now that the statute has been declared unconstitutional.   
 Lastly, an unanswered question is whether or not the Legislature will revisit that 
statute in light of this opinion and add more detail to the statutory language.  
                                                 
9 16 Nev. 63 (1881). 
10 111 Nev. 67, 69 n.2, 888 P.2d 927, 929 n.2 (1995). 
11 Id.; Ex parte Lorraine, 16 Nev. at 63. 
12 74 Nev. 58, 61-62, 322 P.2d 304, 306 (1958) (holding that the “mode or manner of a person’s departure 
from the demanding state generally does not affect his status as a fugitive from justice”). 
13 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 918 (2002). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(15) (1970).   
 
Conclusion 
 NRS 202.360(1)(b), which prohibits possessing a firearm when one is a “fugitive 
from justice,” is unconstitutional because the term “fugitive from justice” is too vague.  
The Court held that it (1) failed to provide notice sufficient to enable persons of ordinary 
intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) lacked specific standards, 
thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. 
 
